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Abstract:	   	   In	  an	  experimental	  setting,	  we	  applied	  a	  dual	  strategy	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  effect	  of	  
pictures	  of	  eyes	  on	  human	  behavior.	  First,	  we	  investigated	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  eyes	  was	  limited	  to	  
interaction	   tasks	   in	   which	   the	   subjects’	   decisions	   influenced	   the	   outcomes	   of	   other	   subjects.	   We	  
expanded	   the	   range	  of	   tasks	   to	   include	   individual	   choice	   tasks	   in	  which	   the	   subjects’	  decisions	  only	  
influenced	  their	  own	  outcomes.	  Second,	  we	  investigated	  whether	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  were	  one	  of	  many	  
social	  cues	  or	  were	  unique	  in	  their	  effect.	  We	  compared	  the	  effect	  of	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  
a	  different	  condition	  in	  which	  we	  presented	  the	  subjects	  with	  pictures	  of	  other	  students	  (peers).	  Our	  
results	  suggest	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  is	  limited	  to	  interaction	  tasks	  and	  that	  eyes	  should	  
be	   considered	   distinct	   from	   other	   social	   cues,	   such	   as	   reminders	   of	   peers.	   While	   pictures	   of	   eyes	  
uniformly	   enhanced	  pro-­‐social	   behavior	   in	   interaction	   tasks,	   this	  was	  not	   the	   case	   for	   reminders	  of	  
peers.	  Furthermore,	   the	  reminders	  of	  peers	   led	   to	  more	  rational	  behavior	   in	   individual	  choice	   tasks,	  
whereas	  the	  effect	  of	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  was	  limited	  to	  situations	  involving	  interaction.	  Combined,	  these	  
findings	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  on	  behavior	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  social	  
exchange	  heuristic	  that	  works	  to	  enhance	  mutual	  cooperative	  behavior.	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1. Introduction	  
Humans	   frequently	  behave	  altruistically,	  even	   towards	  genetically	  unrelated	  strangers.	  While	  some	  
of	   this	   altruistic	   behavior	   can	   likely	   be	   explained	   by	   concerns	   for	   the	   actor’s	   (possible	   third-­‐party)	  
reputation,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   this	   explanation	   is	   incomplete.	   Tightly	   controlled	   economic	  
experiments	   have	   repeatedly	   shown	   that	   subjects	   behave	   in	   an	   altruistic	   manner	   towards	  
anonymous	   strangers,	   even	  when	  opportunities	   for	   repeated	   interaction	  and	   reputation	   formation	  
are	  systematically	  ruled	  out	  (cf.	  Camerer,	  2003).	  Recent	  literature,	  however,	  has	  shown	  that	  people	  
are	  sensitive	  to	  subtle	  cues	  of	  being	  watched.	  In	  particular,	  it	  was	  demonstrated	  that,	  in	  anonymous	  
experimental	  settings,	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  pictures	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  eyes,	  or	  an	  eye-­‐like	  stimulus,	  led	  to	  
significant	   increases	   in	  donations	   to	  strangers	   in	  dictator	  games	   (Haley	  &	  Fessler,	  2005;	  Oda	  et	  al.,	  
2011;	  Rigdon	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Nettle	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  increased	  donations	  to	  a	  public	  good	  (Burnham	  &	  Hare,	  
2007),	   and	   induced	   greater	   disapproval	   of	   moral	   transgressions	   (Bourrat	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   The	  
susceptibility	  of	  human	  beings	   to	   these	  subtle	  cues	   implies	   that,	  even	   in	  an	  anonymous	   laboratory	  
setting,	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   should	   not	   necessarily	   be	   viewed	   as	   purely	   intrinsic	   (Haley	   &	   Fessler,	  
2005;	  Jaeggi	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
A	   number	   of	   studies	   have	   investigated	   the	   generality	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   eyes	   on	   social	   behavior	   and	  
have	   attempted	   to	   gain	   deeper	   insight	   into	   the	   possible	   mechanisms	   underlying	   this	   effect.	   A	  
potential	   concern	   is	   that	   the	   observed	   phenomenon	   may	   have	   been	   caused	   by	   an	   experimenter	  
demand	  effect	  (Ekström,	  2012).	  Field	  experiments,	  however,	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  as	  eye-­‐
like	   stimuli	  have	   induced	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  even	  when	   the	  subjects	  did	  not	  know	  that	   they	  were	  
participating	   in	   an	   experiment.	   Bateson	   et	   al.	   (2006)	   studied	   the	   effect	   pictures	   of	   eyes	   on	   the	  
amount	  of	  money	  that	  employees	  at	  a	  university	  psychology	  department	  contributed	  to	  an	  “honesty	  
box”	   in	   the	   coffee	   room.	   The	   authors	   found	   that,	   when	   a	   picture	   of	   eyes	  was	   placed	   next	   to	   the	  
“honesty	   box”,	   the	   employee	   donations	   tripled.	   Ernest-­‐Jones	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   showed	   that	   placing	  
pictures	  of	  eyes	  in	  a	  university	  cafeteria	  that	  required	  diners	  to	  clear	  their	  own	  trays	  halved	  the	  odds	  
of	  littering.	  However,	  the	  effect	  of	  eyes	  was	  only	  significant	  when	  the	  cafeteria	  was	  relatively	  quiet.	  
Similarly,	   Ekström	   (2012)	   found	   that	   pictures	   of	   eyes	   increased	   the	   amount	   of	   money	   that	   was	  
donated	   to	   charity	   in	   Swedish	   supermarkets	   by	   30%	   during	   days	   on	   which	   relatively	   few	   people	  
visited	  the	  stores.	  On	  the	  days	  on	  which	  the	  stores	  were	  busy,	  the	  eyes	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  customer	  
donations.	  Finally,	  Powell	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  reported	  similar	  results	  to	  the	  previous	  findings.	  The	  authors	  
found	   that	   displaying	   pictures	   of	   eyes	   on	   charity	   collection	   buckets	   in	   a	   supermarket	   increased	  
donations	  and	  that	  this	  effect	  was	  significantly	  stronger	  when	  the	  supermarket	  was	  quiet	  rather	  than	  
busy.	  
[3]	  
Although	  the	  eye	  effect	  appeared	  to	  be	  robust	  in	  field	  settings,	  several	  studies	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  
conditions	  under	  which	  these	  effects	  will	  not	  occur.	  The	  field	  studies	  discussed	  above	  suggested	  that	  
pictures	   of	   eyes	   influence	   behavior	   only	   when	   the	   subject	   is	   in	   a	   non-­‐crowded	   setting.	   Fehr	   and	  
Schneider	  (2009)	  found	  that	  eyes	  did	  not	  influence	  the	  tendency	  of	  trustees	  to	  repay	  trust	  in	  a	  trust	  
game.	   In	  Mifune	   et	   al.	   (2010),	   pictures	   of	   eyes	   increased	   donations	   in	   a	   dictator	   game	  when	   the	  
recipient	  was	  an	  in-­‐group	  member,	  but	  not	  when	  the	  recipient	  was	  an	  out-­‐group	  member.	  
The	   common	   interpretation	   of	   the	   eye	   effect	   is	   that	   pictures	   of	   eyes	   trigger	   feelings	   of	   being	  
watched,	  which	   in	   turn	   activate	   reputation	   concerns	   and	   subsequent	   behavioral	   changes.	   Such	   an	  
argument	  seems	  plausible,	  given	  that	  actual	  opportunities	  to	  acquire	  a	  positive	  reputation	  that	  may	  
pay	   off	   in	   the	   future	   have	   been	   found	   to	   enhance	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   (Engelmann	  &	   Fischbacher,	  
2009;	  Gächter	  &	  Fehr,	  1999;	  Milinski	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  2002;	  Rege	  &	  Telle	  2004;	  Seinen	  &	  Schram	  2006;	  
Wedekind	  &	  Milinski	  2000).	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  Oda	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  provided	  the	  only	  direct	  
test	   of	   this	   conjecture.	   The	   authors	   showed	   that	   the	   eye	   effect	   was	  mediated	   by	   expectations	   of	  
future	  reward	  but	  not	  by	  a	  fear	  of	  punishment.	  	  
In	  the	  present	  study,	  we	  applied	  a	  dual	  strategy	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  effect	  of	  eyes	  on	  human	  
behavior	  by	  expanding	  both	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  tasks	  and	  the	  types	  of	  social	  cues	  that	  were	  used	  as	  
stimuli.	  Firstly,	  we	  examined	  whether	  the	  influence	  of	  eyes	  was	  limited	  to	  interaction	  tasks	  in	  which	  
the	  subjects’	  decisions	  also	  influenced	  the	  outcomes	  of	  other	  subjects,	  or	  whether	  this	  influence	  also	  
carried	   over	   to	   individual	   choice	   tasks	   in	   which	   the	   subjects’	   decisions	   influenced	   only	   their	   own	  
outcomes.	   There	   is	   good	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   eyes	   may	   influence	   decision-­‐making	   in	   non-­‐
interaction	  tasks.	  A	  long	  line	  of	  psychological	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  others	  
can	   facilitate	   the	   performance	   of	   simple	   tasks	   but	   impair	   the	   performance	   of	  more	   complex	   tasks	  
(Bond	   &	   Titus,	   1983;	   Zajonc,	   1965).	   With	   respect	   to	   choice	   behavior,	   research	   on	   accountability	  
suggests	   that	   people	   care	   about	   how	   others	   view	   their	   decisions,	   even	   in	   individual	   choice	   tasks	  
(Kruglanski	  &	  Fruend,	  1983;	  Lerner	  &	  Tetlock,	  1999;	  Vieider,	  2011).	  In	  particular,	  when	  subjects	  know	  
that	  their	  decisions	  will	  be	  made	  public,	  they	  adjust	  their	  behavior	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  prevailing	  view	  
among	  their	  audience.	   If	   the	  view	  of	   the	  audience	   is	  unknown,	   the	  subjects	  engage	   in	  pre-­‐emptive	  
self-­‐criticism,	   by	   carefully	   analyzing	   the	   problem	   to	   arrive	   at	   a	  more	   justifiable	   decision	   (Lerner	  &	  
Tetlock,	  1999).	  These	   findings	  are	   intuitive	  as	  people	  are	  unlikely	   to	  be	  exclusively	   concerned	  with	  
signaling	   a	   cooperative	   disposition;	   they	   will,	   for	   example,	   also	   care	   about	   appearing	   smart,	  
conscientious,	  and	  successful.	  Therefore,	  if	  eye-­‐like	  stimuli	  trigger	  a	  feeling	  of	  being	  monitored,	  their	  
impact	   should	   not	   be	   limited	   to	   triggering	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   in	   interaction	   tasks,	   but	   can	   be	  
expected	  to	  extend	  to	  individual	  choice	  tasks.	  
[4]	  
However,	  it	  is	  not	  definite	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  eyes	  should	  extend	  beyond	  interaction	  tasks.	  Cosmides	  
(1989)	  and	  Cosmides	  and	  Tooby	  (1989,	  1992)	  argued	  that	  humans	  have	  evolved	  specialized,	  domain-­‐
specific	  cognitive	  modules	  for	  solving	  problems	  that	  are	  encountered	  in	  social	  exchange.	  To	  support	  
this	   claim,	   the	  authors	   showed	  empirical	   evidence	   that	  a	   specialized	   cheater-­‐detection	  mechanism	  
existed.	  Later	  research	  suggested	  that	  people	  also	  have	  a	  memory	  bias	  for	  cheaters	  (see	  Mealey	  et	  al,	  
1996,	   Oda,	   1997,	   and	   Oda	   &	   Nakajima,	   2010;	   see	   Barclay	   and	   Lalumière,	   2006,	   and	   Mehl	   and	  
Buchner,	   2008,	   for	   contradictory	   findings).	   The	   ability	   to	   detect	   and	   remember	   cheaters	   may	   be	  
necessary	   to	   successfully	  establish	   relationships	  of	  mutual	   cooperation.	  However,	   this	  ability	   is	  not	  
sufficient	   because	   people	   must	   also	   aspire	   to	   cooperate	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Kiyonari	   et	   al.	   (2000)	  
therefore	  proposed	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  “social	  exchange	  heuristic,”	  which	  facilitates	  the	  establishment	  
of	  mutual	  cooperation	  by	  encouraging	  subjects	  to	  perceive	  one-­‐shot	  prisoner	  dilemmas	  as	  assurance	  
games	  in	  which	  mutual	  cooperation	  is	  the	  most	  preferable	  outcome.	  As	  argued	  by	  Oda	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  
the	  eye	  effect	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  similar	  social	  heuristic	  that	  evolved	  to	  facilitate	  mutual	  cooperation.	  If	  
this	  social	  heuristic	   is	  the	  cause,	  then	  there	   is	  no	  a	  priori	  reason	  to	  expect	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  to	  have	  
any	   effect	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   interaction	   and	   thus,	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   eyes	   will	   influence	  
behavior	  in	  individual	  choice	  tasks.	  
Secondly,	   in	  addition	  to	  exploring	  whether	  pictures	  of	  eyes	   influenced	  behavior	   in	   individual	  choice	  
tasks,	  we	  investigated	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  influence	  by	  comparing	  this	  effect	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  another	  
condition	   that	   was	   designed	   to	   remind	   the	   subjects	   of	   other	   people	   in	   their	   social	   group.	   The	  
literature	   is	   somewhat	   ambivalent	   regarding	   whether	   eyes	   are	   special	   cues	   or	   simply	   one	   among	  
many	  social	  cues	  that	  could	  produce	  the	  same	  result.	  For	  instance,	  in	  addition	  to	  presenting	  subjects	  
with	   pictures	   of	   eyes,	   Haley	   and	   Fessler	   (2005)	   manipulated	   auditory	   cues	   that	   indicated	   the	  
presence	   of	   others	   by	   using	   sound-­‐deafening	   earmuffs.	   The	   authors	   found	   that	   the	   earmuffs	  
appeared	  to	  reduce	  the	  subjects’	  generosity,	  although	  the	  effect	  did	  not	  reach	  statistical	  significance.	  
Lambda	  and	  Mace	  (2010)	  studied	  whether	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  students	  influenced	  decisions	  in	  an	  
ultimatum	   game	   if	   the	   subjects	   were	   explicitly	   guaranteed	   that	   their	   decisions	   would	   remain	  
anonymous.	   The	   authors	   found	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   other	   students	   did	   not	   affect	   the	   subjects’	  
behavior	  and	  cited	   this	   result	  as	  evidence	  against	  an	  eye	  effect.	  Being	   reminded	  of	  others	  without	  
being	   exposed	   to	   a	   direct	   eye	   gaze	   may	   not	   have	   the	   same	   effect	   as	   an	   eye	   cue.	   To	   investigate	  
whether	  the	  effects	  were	  the	  same,	  we	  also	  implemented	  a	  peers	  condition	  in	  which	  pictures	  of	  our	  





Figure	  1:	  Screenshot	  of	  the	  university	  website	  as	  used	  in	  the	  experiment.	  Placed	  at	  the	  top	  left	  of	  the	  
screen,	  the	  pictures	  randomly	  rotate	  every	  six	  seconds.	  The	  picture	  displayed	  on	  the	  screenshot	  above	  is	  one	  of	  




We	   conducted	   an	   online	   experiment	   on	   165	   students	   from	   the	   Erasmus	   School	   of	   Economics	  
(henceforth	  ESE),	  Erasmus	  University	  Rotterdam,	  the	  Netherlands	  (32%	  females,	  age	  range	  =	  18–33,	  
mean	  =	  21.1	   years,	   S.D.	   =	  2.06	  years).	   The	  experiment	  was	   conducted	  during	   the	   first	  half	  of	   June	  
2010.	   We	   sent	   an	   email	   that	   contained	   personalized	   links	   to	   the	   website	   developed	   for	   the	  
experiment	   to	  600	  students.	  The	  students	  were	   informed	  that	   the	  deadline	   to	  participate	  was	   two	  
weeks	  after	  receipt	  of	  the	  recruitment	  email	  and	  that	  the	  payment	  for	  their	  participation	  could	  range	  
up	  to	  €50;	  they	  received	  an	  email	  reminder	  one	  week	  after	  the	  initial	  email.	  The	  invitation	  emails	  and	  
instructions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  electronic	  supplementary	  material.	  The	  subjects	  were	  permitted	  to	  






Figure	  2.	  Pictures	  used	  in	  each	  condition.	  (A)	  Eyes,	  (B)	  Peers,	  (C)	  Control.	  (In	  the	  experiment,	  the	  faces	  of	  




We	  constructed	  a	  replica	  of	  the	  ESE	  website	  (Figure	  1)	  for	  this	  experiment.	  After	  the	  initial	   login	  to	  
any	   computer	  at	   the	  ESE,	   Internet	  Explorer	  opens	  up	  automatically.	   The	  homepage	  consists	  of	   the	  
ESE	   website,	   which	   displays	   news	   and	   important	   information.	   Students	   and	   staff	   members	   are	  
required	  to	  use	  this	  website	  to	  look	  up	  information	  and	  for	  many	  administrative	  procedures.	  Similarly	  
to	  the	  ESE	  website,	  our	  experimental	  website	  was	  bilingual	  (Dutch	  and	  English)	  and	  compatible	  with	  
most	   browsers	   (such	   as	   Internet	   Explorer,	   Mozilla	   Firefox,	   Opera,	   Safari,	   and	   Chrome)	   and	   most	  
screen	  sizes.	  
To	   present	   our	   subjects	   with	   pictures	   of	   eyes	   and	   peers	   in	   an	   unobtrusive	   manner,	   we	   used	   the	  
picture	  banner	  from	  the	  official	  ESE	  website.	  This	  banner	  typically	  displays	  rotating	  pictures	  from	  the	  
campus.	   The	   pictures	   rotate	   randomly	   at	   an	   approximate	   interval	   of	   six	   seconds.	  We	   constructed	  
three	  conditions	  by	  manipulating	  the	  types	  of	  pictures	  that	  rotated	   in	  this	  banner.	  The	  banner	  was	  
visible	  to	  the	  subjects	  during	  the	  entire	  experiment.	  
For	   the	   eyes	   condition,	   we	   used	   pictures	   of	   the	   faces	   of	   statues	   of	   Erasmus,	   who	   is	   the	   school’s	  
namesake.	  The	  students	  are	   familiar	  with	   images	  of	  Erasmus	  because	  there	  are	  multiple	  statues	  of	  
him	  on	  the	  campus	  and	  his	  image	  appears	  on	  official	  university	  documents.	  Thus,	  using	  such	  pictures	  
would	   not	   appear	   out	   of	   the	   ordinary,	   and	   we	   could	   safely	   assume	   that	   the	   cues	   remained	  
[7]	  
sufficiently	  subtle.	  Moreover,	  the	  neutral	  facial	  expressions	  displayed	  by	  the	  statues	  reduced	  the	  risk	  
of	  accidently	  priming	  emotions	  (Figure	  2A).	  
For	  the	  peers	  condition,	  we	  used	  pictures	  of	  students	  who	  were	  not	  looking	  directly	  at	  the	  camera	  to	  
avoid	   a	   potential	   eye	   effect.	   The	   students	   in	   these	   pictures	   were	   engaged	   in	   studying,	   chatting,	  
having	   lunch,	   etc.,	   on	   campus.	   Our	   subject	   pool	   consisted	   of	   undergraduate	   students,	   thus	   the	  
representations	  of	  their	  fellow	  university	  students	  could	  act	  as	  social	  cues	  that	  remind	  them	  of	  their	  
own	  social	  group	  (Figure	  2B,	  please	  note	  that	  faces	  have	  been	  obscured	  for	  publication	  purposes	  but	  
were	  visible	  in	  the	  experiment).	  
Finally,	   as	   a	   control,	  we	  used	  pictures	  of	   empty	  halls	   from	  university	   buildings	   (Figure	   2C).	  On	   the	  
whole,	   the	  pictures	   from	  the	   three	  conditions	  did	  not	  differ	  much	   from	  pictures	  one	  could	   find	  on	  
any	   university	   website	   and	   were	   similar	   to	   the	   pictures	   normally	   found	   on	   the	   ESE	   website.	   In	  
addition	   to	   these	   condition	   specific	   pictures,	   the	   subjects	   also	   viewed	   two	   pictures	   of	   university	  
buildings	  that	  were	  common	  to	  all	  conditions	  and	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  ESE	  website.	  Each	  subject	  was	  
randomly	   allocated	   to	   one	   of	   the	   three	   conditions,	   and	   all	   of	   the	   tasks	   were	   carried	   out	   for	   real	  
money	  for	  some	  randomly	  selected	  subjects	  after	  the	  experiment.	  
During	   the	  experiment,	   the	   subjects	   completed	   four	   tasks:	   two	   tasks	   involved	   interaction	  between	  
the	  subjects,	  and	  two	  tasks	  involved	  individual	  choices	  under	  uncertainty.	  The	  order	  of	  the	  tasks	  was	  
randomized	   across	   subjects.	   The	   four	   tasks	  were	   selected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   past	   research	   and	  were	  
designed	   so	   that	   social	   cues	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   impact	   the	   subjects’	   behavior.	   Each	   task	   and	   the	  
corresponding	  predictions	  are	  described	  in	  detail	  below.	  
At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  experiment,	   the	  students	  answered	  a	  small	  questionnaire	   including	  demographic	  
questions	   (gender,	   age,	   nationality,	   and	   education).	   For	   details	   we	   refer	   to	   the	   electronic	  
supplementary	   material.	   Some	   of	   the	   answers	   for	   the	   first	   task	   described	   below	   were	   missing.	  
Approximately	  60	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  re-­‐enter	  their	  answers,	  of	  whom	  12	  failed	  to	  do	  so.	  As	  this	  
affected	  every	  condition	  equally,	  there	  was	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  would	  affect	  our	  results.	  We	  
nonetheless	   studied	   whether	   it	   had	   any	   effect	   on	   our	   results	   and	   found	   that	   it	   had	   none	   (see	  
electronic	   supplementary	   material).	   For	   each	   task,	   we	   report	   simple	   non-­‐parametric	   tests	   for	  
differences	  between	  conditions.	  The	  more	  advanced	  parametric	  statistical	  models	  that	  controlled	  for	  
the	  subjects’	  characteristics	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  electronic	  supplementary	  material.	  All	  of	  the	  results	  
reported	   in	   this	   paper	  were	   robust,	   and	   statistical	   significance	  was	   generally	   stronger	   in	   the	  more	  
advanced	  analyses	  than	  in	  the	  simple	  analyses.	  
	  
[8]	  
2.3.	  Task	  1:	  Joy	  of	  destruction	  mini-­‐game	  
The	   first	   interaction	   task	  we	  used	  was	   the	   so-­‐called	   Joy	  of	  Destruction	  mini-­‐game	   (JoD)	   (Abbink	  &	  
Herrmann,	  2010).	  Although	  research	  on	  cooperation	  and	  social-­‐preferences	  has	  traditionally	  focused	  
on	  pro-­‐social	  behavior,	  a	  recent	  and	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  has	  begun	  to	  apply	  economic	  games	  
to	  the	  study	  of	  anti-­‐social	  behavior,	  such	  as	  the	  anti-­‐social	  punishment	  of	  cooperators	  in	  public	  good	  
settings	  (e.g.,	  Gächter	  &	  Herrmann,	  2009;	  Gächter	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Herrmann	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  The	  JoD	  has	  
been	  used	  in	  this	  literature	  to	  show	  that	  a	  considerable	  fraction	  of	  subjects	  is	  willing	  to	  pay	  money	  to	  
destroy	  part	  of	  the	  payoff	  to	  another	  subject.	  In	  particular,	  the	  subjects	  destroyed	  their	  opponents’	  
payoffs	  only	  infrequently	  when	  their	  behavior	  could	  be	  perfectly	  observed	  and	  their	  opponents	  could	  
find	  out	  with	  certainty	  what	  caused	  the	  destruction.	  However,	  when	  the	  scenario	  was	  altered	  so	  that	  
their	  opponent	  could	  no	  longer	  find	  out	  with	  certainty	  whether	  the	  destruction	  was	  caused	  by	  nature	  
or	   by	   intention,	   the	   subjects’	   willingness	   to	   destroy	  markedly	   increased.	   Note	   that	   this	   difference	  
occurred	  despite	  the	  complete	  anonymity	  of	  the	  subjects	   in	  both	  cases	  (Abbink	  &	  Herrmann,	  2010;	  
Abbink	  &	  Sadrieh,	  2009).	  
To	   achieve	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   destruction	   and	   thereby	   facilitate	   the	   investigation	   of	   possible	  
differences	  between	  our	  conditions,	  we	  adopted	  the	  “hidden”	  setup	  of	  the	  JoD	  in	  which	  it	  is	  unclear	  
to	   the	   subjects	  what	   caused	   the	   reduction	   of	   their	   income.	   In	   our	   JoD	   variant,	   two	   subjects	   each	  
received	  an	  endowment	  of	  €25.	  Then,	  unaware	  of	  each	  other’s	   identity,	  both	   subjects	  were	  asked	  
whether	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  €1	  to	  destroy	  €10	  of	  the	  other	  subject’s	  endowment.	  There	  was	  
a	  1/3	  probability	   that	  €10	  of	   the	  opposing	   subject’s	  endowment	  would	  be	  destroyed	   regardless	  of	  
the	   subject’s	   decision,	   making	   it	   impossible	   for	   the	   opposing	   subject	   to	   tell	   what	   caused	   the	  
destruction.	  
In	   the	   JoD	   game,	   there	   is	   no	   compelling	   rationale	   behind	   destruction:	   it	   is	   harmful	   to	   others	   and	  
costly	   to	   oneself.	   Previous	   findings	   on	   the	   JoD	   further	   suggest	   that	   destruction	   mainly	   occurs	   in	  
situations	  in	  which	  the	  behavior	  cannot	  be	  perfectly	  observed.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  findings,	  and	  of	  past	  
studies	  that	  have	  showed	  that	  eyes	  increase	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  in	  simple	  tasks,	  we	  consider	  this	  task	  
a	   way	   to	   validate	   whether	   the	   effect	   of	   our	   eyes	   cues	   align	   with	   the	   past	   findings	   of	   eyes.	  
Furthermore,	   the	  design	  of	   this	   task	  also	  allows	  us	   to	   compare	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  eyes	   to	   the	  peers	  





2.4.	  Task	  2:	  Dictator	  game	  
The	  second	  interaction	  task	  was	  the	  dictator	  game,	  which	  is	  widely	  studied	  in	  economics	  and	  which	  
demonstrates	  what	  is	  often	  deemed	  to	  be	  pure	  altruism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  subjects	  (Camerer,	  2003).	  
In	  this	  game,	  one	  subject,	  the	  dictator,	  received	  a	  monetary	  endowment	  of	  €50	  and	  was	  asked	  how	  
much	  she	  would	  donate	  to	  another	  anonymous	  subject.	  The	  other	  subject	  simply	  received	  what	  had	  
been	  donated	  to	  her,	  and	  nothing	  else.	  The	  pro-­‐social	  action	  here	  was	  to	  donate	  some	  money	  to	  the	  
receiver,	  but	  this	  would	  in	  return	  lower	  the	  dictator’s	  own	  income.	  We	  chose	  this	  task	  because	  the	  
impact	  of	  eye-­‐like	  stimuli	  on	  the	  dictator	  game	  has	  been	  studied	  before	  (Haley	  &	  Fessler,	  2005;	  Oda	  
et	   al.,	   2011;	   Rigdon	   et	   al.,	   2009	  Nettle	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   These	   past	   studies	   found	   that	   donation	   rates	  
were	  significantly	  higher	  in	  response	  to	  eye	  cues.	  Including	  this	  task	  in	  our	  experiment	  thus	  provides	  
us	   with	   another	   opportunity	   to	   see	   whether	   we	   could	   replicate	   the	   eye	   effect	   in	   our	   web-­‐based	  
setup.	  Furthermore,	   it	  provided	  us	  with	  a	  second	  opportunity	  to	  compare	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  eyes	  to	  
the	  effect	  of	  peers	  in	  an	  interaction	  task.	  
	  
2.5.	  Task	  3:	  Ellsberg’s	  paradox	  	  
The	  third	  task	  we	  employed	  was	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  standard	  ambiguity	  aversion	  task	  devised	  by	  Ellsberg	  
(1961).	  The	  task	  included	  two	  bags	  containing	  black	  and	  red	  chips.	  In	  one	  bag	  (Bag	  K),	  the	  proportion	  
of	  red	  and	  black	  chips	  was	  known,	  whereas	  in	  the	  second	  bag	  (Bag	  U),	  this	  proportion	  was	  unknown.	  
The	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  choose	  a	  color	  (black	  or	  red)	  and	  a	  bag	  from	  which	  to	  draw	  a	  chip.	  If	  the	  
color	  of	   the	  drawn	  chip	  matched	   the	   color	   that	   the	   subject	  had	   chosen,	   then	   the	   subject	   received	  
€50.	  	  
When	  the	  proportion	  of	   red	  and	  black	  chips	   is	  50-­‐50,	  Bag	  K	  and	  Bag	  U	  are	  normatively	  equivalent.	  
Following	   Laplace’s	   argument	   that	   ignorance	   should	   be	   represented	   by	   a	   uniform	   probability	  
distribution,	   Bag	   U	   should	   also	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   50-­‐50	   bag.	   If	   the	   subjects	   do	   not	   follow	   this	  
argument	  and	  believe	  that	  one	  of	  the	  colors	  makes	  up	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  balls	  in	  Bag	  U,	  then	  they	  
should	   bet	   on	   this	   color	   and	   strictly	   prefer	   Bag	   U.	   Nevertheless,	  many	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   a	  
disproportionate	   number	   of	   people	   choose	   Bag	   K	   (Camerer	   &	  Weber,	   1992).	   The	   distaste	   for	   the	  
unknown	  bag	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   ambiguity	   aversion,	   and,	   given	   that	   the	   bags	   are	   normatively	  
equivalent,	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  bias	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Raiffa,	  1961).	  
In	  our	  experiment,	  we	  implemented	  the	  standard	  Ellsberg	  choice	  situation	  with	  a	  50-­‐50	  proportion	  of	  
red	  and	  black	  chips	  in	  Bag	  K,	  however	  we	  also	  varied	  the	  proportion	  of	  red	  and	  black	  chips	  from	  10%-­‐
90%	  to	  90%-­‐10%	  (i.e.,	  10%-­‐90%,	  20%-­‐80%,	  30%-­‐70%…).	  For	  each	  possible	  proportion	  for	  Bag	  K,	  the	  
[10]	  
subjects	  were	  asked	   to	   state	  which	  bag	   (K	  or	  U)	   they	  would	  prefer	   to	  draw	  a	  ball	   from.	  When	   the	  
probability	  was	  different	   from	  50%,	   the	  subjects	  overwhelmingly	  selected	  the	  normatively	  superior	  
option,	   i.e.,	   Bag	   K	   if	   the	   probability	   of	   winning	   in	   this	   bag	   was	   60%	   or	   higher,	   and	   Bag	   U	   if	   the	  
probability	  of	  winning	  in	  Bag	  K	  was	  40%	  or	  lower.	  No	  clear	  differences	  between	  the	  conditions	  could	  
therefore	  be	  detected	  in	  these	  scenarios	  (see	  electronic	  supplementary	  material).	  Hence,	  we	  report	  
only	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  traditional	  50-­‐50	  case.	  
Previous	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  being	  observed	  by	  others	  matters	  for	  this	  task.	  Curley	  et	  al.	  (1986)	  
found	  that	  publicly	  experiencing	  the	  consequence	  of	  one’s	  own	  decision	  in	  an	  Ellsberg	  task	  generates	  
more	   ambiguity	   aversion	   compared	   to	   the	   situation	   where	   privacy	   was	   ensured	   (see	   also	  
Muthukrishnan	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  and	  Trautmann	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  These	  authors	  argued	  that	  subjects	  will	  fear	  
a	   negative	   evaluation	   if	   the	   bet’s	   outcome	   is	   not	   in	   their	   favor,	   and	   the	   subjects	  will	   believe	   that	  
choosing	  bag	  K	  is	  easier	  to	  justify	  due	  to	  its	  informational	  advantage	  (its	  content	  is	  known,	  unlike	  the	  
one	  of	  bag	  U).	  Therefore,	  if	  our	  social	  cues	  (eyes	  and	  peers)	  trigger	  concerns	  of	  being	  monitored,	  we	  
would	  expect	  more	  ambiguity	  aversion	  in	  those	  conditions	  compared	  with	  the	  control.	  
	  
2.6.	  Task	  4:	  Simple	  vs.	  compound	  lotteries	  	  
Bar-­‐Hillel	  (1973)	  has	  shown	  that	  people	  show	  systematic	  biases	  when	  comparing	  simple	  gambles	  to	  
compound	  gambles.	  To	  be	  more	  specific,	  people	  appear	  to	  overestimate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  conjunctive	  
events	   (e.g.,	  drawing,	  with	  replacement,	   four	  red	  chips	   from	  a	  bag	  with	  10	  black	  and	  10	  red	  chips)	  
and	  underestimate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  disjunctive	  events	  (e.g.,	  drawing,	  with	  replacement,	  at	  least	  one	  
red	  chip	  from	  a	  bag	  with	  9	  black	  chips	  and	  1	  red	  chip	  when	  the	  subject	  is	  permitted	  four	  tries).	  The	  
cause	   for	   this	   bias	   is	   often	   thought	   to	   be	   a	   realization	   of	   the	   anchoring	   and	   adjustment	   heuristic	  
(Tversky	  &	  Kahneman,	  1974).	   It	   is	  believed	   that,	  when	   the	   subjects	  evaluate	   the	  compound	  event,	  
they	  think	  about	  the	  probability	  of	  drawing	  a	  particular	  chip,	  which	  then	  takes	  the	  role	  of	  an	  anchor.	  
If	  the	  subjects	  do	  not	  adjust	  properly	  for	  the	  compound	  nature	  of	  the	  event,	  then	  they	  overestimate	  
conjunctive	   events	   and	   underestimate	   disjunctive	   events.	   Thus,	   people	   overvalue	   the	   conjunctive	  
gambles	  and	  undervalue	  the	  disjunctive	  gambles.	  	  
In	  the	  final	  task,	  we	  investigated	  the	  effect	  of	  our	  cues	  on	  subjects’	  evaluation	  of	  compound	  gambles.	  
The	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  make	  six	  choices	  between	  simple	  and	  conjunctive	  (compound)	  gambles.	  
The	   options	   presented	   to	   the	   subjects	  were	   similar	   to	   the	   ones	   proposed	   by	   Bar-­‐Hillel	   (1973)	   and	  
have	   previously	   been	   implemented	   by	   Vieider	   (2011).	   For	   instance,	   in	   a	   simple	   gamble,	   a	   subject	  




the	   chip	   was	   red.	   In	   the	   conjunctive,	   compound	   gamble,	   the	   subject	   extracted	   7	   times	   (with	  
replacement)	  from	  a	  bag	  that	  contained	  18	  red	  and	  2	  black	  chips.	  The	  subject	  won	  €50	  if	  the	  chip	  was	  
red	   each	   time.	   In	   all	   of	   the	   choice-­‐situations	   of	   this	   task,	   the	   probability	   of	  winning	   in	   the	   simple	  
gamble	   exceeded	   the	   probability	   of	   winning	   in	   the	   conjunctive,	   compound	   gamble.	   Although	   the	  
simple	   gamble	  was	   thus	   objectively	   superior	   to	   the	   compound	   gamble,	   past	   research	   has	   showed	  
that	  a	   significant	  number	  of	  people	   found	   the	  compound	  gamble	  more	  attractive	   (Bar-­‐Hillel,	  1973;	  
Kruglanski	  &	  Fruend,	  1983;	  Vieider,	  2011).	  
In	   line	   with	   the	   view	   that	   lowered	   anonymity	   leads	   to	   a	   desire	   to	   make	   better,	   more	   justifiable	  
choices,	   Kruglanski	   and	   Freund	   (1983)	   and	   Vieider	   (2011)	   found	   that	   subjects	   who	   expected	   their	  
choices	  to	  be	  evaluated	  later	  on	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  the	  correct	  choice	  when	  deciding	  between	  
simple	  and	  compound	  events.	  Therefore,	   if	  our	  social	  cues	   (eyes	  and	  peers)	   triggered	  the	  subjects’	  
concerns	   of	   being	  monitored,	  we	  would	   expect	   them	   to	  make	   fewer	  mistakes	   in	   these	   conditions	  
compared	  to	  the	  control.	  
	  
3. Results	  
3.1.	  Task	  1:	  Joy	  of	  destruction	  mini-­‐game	  
The	  overall	  destruction	  rate	  obtained	  in	  the	  JoD	  over	  the	  three	  conditions	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  findings	  
in	  Abbink	  &	  Herrmann	  (2010).	  Over	  our	  entire	  sample,	  24.84%	  of	  the	  subjects	  decided	  to	  destroy	  (N	  
=	   153),	   compared	   with	   25.8%	   of	   the	   subjects	   in	   Abbink	   &	   Herrmann’s	   (2010)	   experiment.	   Across	  
conditions,	  however,	  we	  observed	  sharp	  differences.	  
In	   our	   control	   condition	   (N	   =	   51),	   the	   subjects	   destroyed	   38.78%	   of	   the	   time	   (Figure	   3A).	   The	  
destruction	  rate	  was	  halved	   in	   the	  eyes	   (N	  =	  49)	  and	  peers	   (N	  =	  53)	  conditions	  compared	  with	   the	  
control	  condition,	  constituting	  a	  significant	  decrease	  (eyes:	  17.65%,	  χ2(1)	  =	  5.534,	  P	  =	  0.019;	  peers:	  
18.87%,	   χ2(1)	   =	   4.959,	   P	   =	   0.026).	   There	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   eyes	   and	   the	  






Figure	  3:	  Results	  from	  the	  interaction	  tasks.	  The	  graph	  in	  (A)	  shows	  the	  percentage	  of	  subjects	  who	  chose	  
to	   destroy	   their	   opposing	   subject’s	   money	   in	   the	   JoD	   mini-­‐game,	   while	   the	   graph	   in	   (B)	   shows	   the	   mean	  
amount	  of	  money	  that	  was	  transferred	  in	  the	  dictator	  game	  for	  the	  different	  conditions.	  Error	  bars	  in	  the	  graph	  
in	  (B)	  show	  ±	  1	  standard	  error	  of	  the	  mean.	  	  
	  
3.2.	  Task	  2:	  Dictator	  game	  
The	  standard	  finding	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  dictator	  game	  is	  that	  over	  60%	  of	  the	  subjects	  decide	  to	  give	  
away	   money.	   The	   mean	   donation	   rate	   across	   all	   subjects	   is	   typically	   20%	   of	   the	   endowment,	  
although	   the	   rational,	   self-­‐interested	   action	   is	   not	   to	   allocate	   any	   money	   to	   the	   other	   subject	  
(Camerer,	   2003).	   Across	   our	   entire	   sample,	   our	   findings	  were	   in	   line	  with	   the	   statistics	   presented	  
above;	   a	   total	  of	  63.64%	  of	  our	   subjects	   gave	  away	  money,	  while	   the	  average	  amount	   transferred	  
was	  €10.93,	  or	  approximately	  22%	  of	  the	  €50	  endowment	  (N	  =	  165,	  55	  in	  each	  condition).	  
In	  our	  control	  condition,	  the	  subjects	  gave	  away	  €9.75	  on	  average	  (Figure	  3B).	  The	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  
strongly	  increased	  donations	  to	  an	  average	  amount	  of	  €13.93	  (Mann-­‐Whitney,	  z	  =	  -­‐1.989,	  P	  =	  0.047).	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  average	  donation	  in	  the	  peers	  condition	  did	  not	  significantly	  differ	  from	  the	  control	  
(mean:	   €9.11,	   Mann-­‐Whitney,	   z	   =	   0.817,	   P	   =	   0.414).	   The	   donations	   amounts	   were	   significantly	  





















































Figure	  4:	  Results	  from	  the	  individual	  choice	  tasks.	  The	  graph	  in	  (A)	  shows	  the	  percentage	  of	  subjects	  who	  
chose	  the	  ambiguous	  option	  (Bag	  U)	  over	  the	  risky	  option	  (Bag	  K),	  while	  the	  graph	  in	  (B)	  shows	  the	  percentage	  
of	  subjects	  who	  did	  not	  make	  any	  errors	  in	  the	  final	  task.	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  probability	  of	  donating,	  we	  found	  the	  highest	  rates	  of	  donation	  in	  the	  eyes	  condition,	  
in	  which	  76.36%	  of	   the	   subjects	  donated	   some	  amount.	   In	   the	   control,	   the	  percentage	  of	   subjects	  
who	  donated	  was	  considerably	   lower	  than	   in	  the	  eyes	  condition,	  at	  63.64%,	  and	  the	   lowest	  rate	  of	  
donation	  occurred	  in	  the	  peers	  condition,	  at	  50.91%.	  Here,	  however,	  neither	  the	  eyes	  nor	  the	  peers	  
condition	   differed	   significantly	   from	   the	   control	   (χ2(1)	   <	   2.121,	   P	   >	   0.145).	   The	   eyes	   and	   peers	  
conditions	  differed	  significantly	  from	  each	  other,	   in	  that	  the	  subjects	  from	  the	  eyes	  condition	  were	  
significantly	  more	   likely	  to	  donate	  compared	  the	  subjects	   in	  the	  peers	  condition	  (χ2(1)	  =	  7.700,	  P	  =	  
0.006).	  
	  
3.3.	  Task	  3:	  Ellsberg’s	  paradox	  	  
In	  the	  Ellsberg	  task,	  the	  subjects	  chose	  between	  two	  bags.	  The	  probability	  of	  winning	  was	  known	  for	  
Bag	   K	   (50%)	   and	   unknown	   for	   Bag	  U.	   In	   line	  with	   past	   findings,	  we	   observed	   that	   the	  majority	   of	  
subjects	   chose	   Bag	   K	   in	   our	   control	   condition,	  while	   only	   a	   small	   fraction	   selected	   Bag	  U	   (N	   =	   55,	  
14.45%,	   see	   Figure	   4A).	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   interaction	   tasks,	   we	   found	   no	   effect	   of	   eyes	   on	   the	  
subjects’	   bag	   choice	   (N	   =	   55,	   20%,	   χ2(1)	   =	   0.573,	   P	   =	   0.449).	   In	   the	  peers	   condition,	   however,	   the	  
subjects	  were	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  show	  a	  bias	  against	  the	  ambiguous	  option	  than	  in	  the	  other	  
conditions:	   more	   than	   a	   third	   of	   the	   subjects	   in	   this	   condition	   chose	   Bag	   U	   (N	   =	   55,	   34.55%,	  




























































3.4.	  Task	  4:	  Simple	  vs.	  compound	  lotteries	  
The	  simple	  gamble	  is	  always	  preferable	  to	  the	  compound	  gamble;	  thus,	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  choices	  
that	  favor	  the	  compound	  gambles	  as	  errors.	  In	  the	  control	  condition	  (N	  =	  55),	  fewer	  than	  a	  third	  of	  
the	   subjects	   did	   not	   make	   any	   errors	   (Figure	   4B).	   There	   was	   no	   difference	   between	   the	   eyes	  
condition	   (N	   =	   55)	   and	   the	   control	   condition	   (both	   32.73%,	   χ2(1)	   =	   0.000,	   P	   =	   1).	   In	   the	   peers	  
condition	   (N	  =	  55),	  however,	  49.09%	  of	   the	  subjects	  never	  made	  an	  error.	  The	  difference	  between	  
the	   peers	   condition	   and	   the	   two	   other	   conditions	   was	   marginally	   significant	   when	   the	   other	  
conditions	  were	   separate	   (both:	   χ2(1)	   =	   3.046,	   P	   =	   0.081)	   and	   significant	   at	   the	   five	   percent	   level	  
when	  the	  other	  two	  conditions	  were	  combined	  (χ2(1)	  =	  4.160,	  P	  =	  0.041).	  
The	  number	  of	  errors	  reveals	  a	  similar	  pattern	  to	  the	  results	  presented	  above.	  The	  median	  number	  of	  
errors	  made	  was	  one	  out	  of	  six	  in	  the	  peers	  condition,	  compared	  with	  two	  out	  of	  six	  in	  the	  other	  two	  
conditions.	  The	  mean	  number	  of	  errors	  made	  was	  2.27	  in	  the	  control,	  1.98	  in	  the	  eyes	  condition	  and	  
1.60	   in	   the	   peers	   condition.	   Mann-­‐Whitney	   tests	   indicated	   that	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   number	   of	  
errors	  was	  marginally	  significant	  between	  the	  peers	  and	  the	  control	  conditions	  (Mann-­‐Whitney,	  z	  =	  




In	  the	  current	  paper,	  we	  applied	  a	  dual	  strategy	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  effect	  of	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  
on	   human	   behavior.	   First,	   to	   identify	   whether	   the	   eye	   effect	   was	   limited	   to	   interaction	   tasks,	   we	  
expanded	   the	   range	  of	   tasks	   to	   include	   individual	   choice	   tasks.	   Second,	   to	   ascertain	  whether	   eyes	  
were	   special	   or	  were	   simply	   one	   among	  many	   social	   cues	   that	  may	   produce	   the	   same	   results,	  we	  
compared	   the	  effect	  of	  eyes	  with	   the	  effect	  of	  another	  condition	   that	  presented	   the	   subjects	  with	  
pictures	  of	  other	  students	  (peers).	  
In	  agreement	  with	  past	   findings,	  we	   found	  that	  pictures	  of	  eyes	   led	   to	  more	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	   in	  
interaction	  tasks.	  Our	  results	  revealed	  that	  the	  subjects	  gave	  more	  money	  to	  strangers	  and	  were	  less	  
likely	  to	  destroy	  the	  endowment	  of	  others	  in	  response	  to	  eyes	  cues.	  However,	  we	  found	  that	  eyes	  did	  
not	  influence	  subjects’	  behavior	  in	  individual	  choice	  tasks,	  in	  which	  the	  choices	  did	  not	  influence	  the	  
outcomes	   of	   others.	   This	   difference	   suggests	   that	   the	   eye	   effect	   is	   limited	   to	   the	   situations	   that	  
involved	   interaction,	  which	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	   view	   that	   this	   effect	  may	  be	   caused	  by	   a	   social	  
exchange	  heuristic	  that	  works	  to	  establish	  mutual	  cooperation,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Oda	  et	  al.	  (2011).	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The	  differences	  between	  the	  eyes	  condition	  and	  the	  peers	  condition	  show	  that	  different	  social	  cues	  
can	  have	  different	  behavioral	  implications.	  In	  the	  dictator	  game,	  the	  eyes	  promoted	  giving,	  while	  the	  
peers	  did	  not.	  Moreover,	  the	  peers	  influenced	  behavior	  in	  the	  two	  individual	  choice	  tasks,	  while	  the	  
eyes	  did	  not.	  The	  finding	  that	  different	  social	  cues	  can	  have	  different	  effects	  is	  important	  because	  it	  
implies	  that	  care	  is	  required	  to	  avoid	  drawing	  overly	  general	  conclusions	  from	  the	  observed	  effects	  of	  
one	  specific	  social	  cue.	  
It	   is	   noteworthy	   that,	   in	   the	   individual	   choice	   tasks,	   the	   peers	   condition	   uniformly	   increased	  
economic	  rationality.	   In	  that	  condition,	  we	  observed	   less	  ambiguity	  aversion	  and	  fewer	  mistakes	   in	  
choices	   between	   simple	   versus	   compound	   lotteries.	   In	   the	   interaction	   tasks,	   we	   found	   that	   peers	  
only	   influenced	   behavior	   in	   the	   JoD	   game,	   where	   the	   pro-­‐social	   act	   of	   not	   destroying	   is	   also	  
economically	  rational.	  By	  contrast,	  peers	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  influence	  behavior	  in	  the	  dictator	  game,	  
in	  which	  the	  pro-­‐social	  and	  the	  rational	  action	  misalign.	  In	  short,	  the	  criterion	  of	  economic	  rationality	  
seems	   to	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   peers	   condition.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   this	   effect	   may	   be	   an	  
artifact	  of	  our	  subject	  pool,	  which	  consisted	  of	  subjects	  who	  were	  all	  trained	  in	  economics	  and	  might	  
fear	  negative	  judgment	  from	  their	  peers	  if	  they	  do	  not	  make	  a	  rational	  decision.	  However,	  it	  should	  
be	   noted	   that	   this	   finding	   also	   agrees	   with	   the	   general	   tenet	   of	   the	   accountability	   literature	   that	  
considering	  the	  judgment	  of	  others	  will	  encourage	  pre-­‐emptive	  self-­‐criticism	  and	  careful	  analysis	  of	  
the	  problem	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  more	  justifiable	  decision	  (Lerner	  &	  Tetlock,	  1999).	  While	  the	  finding	  of	  the	  
peers	  condition	  in	  the	  ambiguity	  task	  contradicts	  the	  recent	  literature	  that	  suggests	  that	  considering	  
others’	  judgment	  will	  increase	  ambiguity	  aversion,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  papers	  have	  all	  
focused	  on	  the	  observation	  of	   the	  actual	  outcome	  by	  others.	  The	  accountability	   literature	  suggests	  
that	  expecting	  judgment	  based	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  one’s	  decisions	  generally	  hampers	  performance,	  
while	  expecting	  judgment	  based	  on	  the	  decision	  process	  employed	  generally	  improves	  performance	  
(Siegel-­‐Jacobs	   and	   Yates,	   1996;	   Simonson	   and	   Staw,	   1992).	   It	   may	   be	   that	   being	   presented	   with	  
pictures	   of	   peers	   during	   decision-­‐making	   caused	   the	   latter,	   rather	   than	   the	   former,	  mechanism	   to	  
operate.	  The	  latter	  mechanism	  could	  explain	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  the	  current	  study.	  
It	   is	  possible	  that	  an	  alternative	  mechanism,	  different	   from	  considerations	  about	  others’	   judgment,	  
may	  have	  caused	  the	  peers	  effect.	  For	  example,	  pictures	  that	  feature	  multiple	  people	  may	  trigger	  a	  
competitive	   mindset,	   i.e.,	   a	   desire	   to	   outperform	   others.	   Alternatively,	   the	   pictures	   in	   the	   peers	  
condition,	  which	  displayed	  other	  people	  who	  did	  not	   look	  directly	   at	   the	   camera,	  may	  have	  made	  
anonymity	   even	  more	   salient	   than	   the	   pictures	   in	   the	   control	   condition,	   which	   did	   not	   show	   any	  
people	  at	  all.	  While	  the	  former	  explanation	  could	  account	  for	  the	  increased	  performance	  in	  individual	  
choice	   tasks,	   it	   is	   not	   straightforward	   how	   the	   latter	   could	   do	   so.	   More	   importantly,	   both	  
mechanisms	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  interaction	  tasks.	  Competitive	  subjects	  should	  give	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less	  than	  other	  subjects	  in	  the	  dictator	  game,	  which	  we	  did	  not	  observe.	  Furthermore,	  both	  increased	  
competitiveness	  and	  anonymity	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  increase	  destruction	  in	  the	  JoD	  game.	  In	  this	  
game,	   subjects	   with	   a	   competitive	   mindset	   may	   attempt	   to	   improve	   their	   relative	   payoffs	   by	  
destroying	   part	   of	   their	   opponents’	   endowment,	   and	   increasing	   anonymity	   has	   been	   found	   to	  
increase	   destruction	   rates	   in	   previous	   studies	   (Abbink	   and	   Herrman,	   2010;	   Abbink	   and	   Sadrieh,	  
2009).	   By	   contrast,	   we	   found	   that	   destruction	   was	   significantly	   lower	   in	   the	   peers	   condition	  
compared	  with	  the	  control.	  	  
The	  influence	  of	  our	  subtle	  cues	  on	  the	  subjects’	  behavior	  is	  remarkable,	  given	  that	  the	  pictures	  we	  
employed	  were	   common	   pictures	   that	   can	   be	   found	   on	   any	   university	  website.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	  
noteworthy	  that	  we	  found	  significant	  effects	  for	  both	  of	  the	  social	  cues	  in	  a	  web-­‐based	  experiment.	  
Web-­‐based	   experiments	   have	   the	   advantage	   of	   diminishing	   the	   participation	   costs	   for	   subjects	  
because	   they	   do	   not	   need	   to	   come	   to	   the	   laboratory	   and	   are	   free	   to	   participate	   at	   any	   time.	  
Furthermore,	  these	  experiments	  allow	  subjects	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  their	  natural	  environment.	  The	  
obvious	  drawback	   is	   that	   the	  environment	   in	  which	  subjects	  make	  their	  decisions	   is	   less	  controlled	  
than	  it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  laboratory.	  For	  our	  experiment,	  it	  was	  possible	  that	  subjects	  were	  in	  a	  public	  
setting	  when	   they	  participated	   in	   the	  experiment,	  which	  could	   reduce	   the	   relative	  effectiveness	  of	  
the	  social	  cues	  (Ekström,	  2012;	  Ernest-­‐Jones	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Powell	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  using	  a	  web-­‐
based	  design	  instead	  of	  a	  carefully	  controlled	  anonymous	  laboratory	  setting	  potentially	  lowered	  our	  
chances	   of	   finding	   statistically	   significant	   effects	   (i.e.,	   increased	   type	   II	   errors).	   That	   we	   found	  
statistically	  significant	  effects	  of	  eyes	  in	  both	  interaction	  tasks	  and	  peers	  in	  both	  the	  individual	  choice	  
tasks	  and	  one	  of	  the	  interaction	  tasks	  suggests	  that	  reduction	  in	  control	  was	  not	  a	  major	  problem	  in	  
our	  experiment.	  
Interestingly,	  in	  another	  recent	  web-­‐based	  study,	  Raihani	  and	  Bshary	  (2012)	  were	  unable	  to	  find	  an	  
eye	  effect	   in	  a	  dictator	  game	  played	  online	  using	  Amazon	  Mechanical	  Turk	   (AMT).	  Our	  experiment	  
differs	  from	  theirs	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  conclusively	  identify	  what	  caused	  
the	  results	  to	  differ.	  Raihani	  and	  Bshary	  (2012)	  argued	  that	  interacting	  via	  AMT	  may	  have	  caused	  the	  
subjects	   to	   feel	   truly	  anonymous	  and	  therefore	  be	   irresponsive	   to	  subtle	  social	  cues,	   similar	   to	   the	  
argument	   put	   forth	   by	   Lambda	   and	   Mace	   (2010).	   This	   increased	   anonymity	   may	   explain	   the	  
discrepancy	  between	  our	  findings	  and	  the	  findings	  from	  Raihani	  and	  Bshary	  (2012),	  as	  AMT	  ensures	  a	  
larger	  degree	  of	   anonymity	   than	  our	  experimental	   setup.	   In	  our	  experiment,	   the	   subjects	   received	  
personalized	   links	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  experiment	  and	   the	  payment	  of	   randomly	  selected	  subjects	  
was	   conducted	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   so	   that	   the	   subjects	   could	   verify	   that	   the	   gambles	   in	   individual	   choice	  
tasks	   were	   fairly	   resolved.	   Another	   explanation	   for	   the	   difference,	   however,	   may	   be	   that,	   in	   our	  
experiment,	   the	   subjects	  played	   the	  game	  against	   fellow	   students	   from	   the	   same	  university,	  while	  
[17]	  
the	  subjects	   in	  Raihani	  and	  Bshary’s	  experiment	  played	  against	  subjects	   from	  all	  over	  the	  world.	   In	  
light	  of	  Mifune	  et	  al.’s	   (2010)	   finding	  that	  pictures	  of	  eyes	  make	  people	  act	  more	  altruistically	  only	  
towards	  members	   from	   their	  own	   in-­‐group,	   this	  provides	  another	  explanation	   for	  why	  we	   found	  a	  
significant	  effect	  of	  eyes	  while	  Raihani	  and	  Bshary	  (2012)	  did	  not.	  
To	  study	  the	  eye	  effect	  in	  an	  unobtrusive	  manner,	  we	  used	  pictures	  of	  Erasmus’	  eyes.	  Seeing	  Erasmus	  
on	   the	   website	   would	   be	   normal	   for	   our	   subjects,	   who	   all	   studied	   at	   the	   Erasmus	   School	   of	  
Economics.	  However,	   the	   image	  of	   a	   famous	   intellectual	   such	  as	  Erasmus	   could	   induce	  a	  desire	   to	  
appear	  smart.	  Priming	  subjects	  with	  words	  such	  as	  “professor”	  has	  been	  found	  to	  improve	  subjects’	  
performance	  at	  answering	  trivia	  questions	  (Dijksterhuis	  &	  van	  Knippenberg,	  1998).	  Nevertheless,	  we	  
do	  not	  believe	  that	  our	  experiment	  was	  compromised	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  First,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  all	  
of	  the	  subjects	  from	  the	  three	  conditions	  were,	  in	  a	  sense,	  primed	  with	  “Erasmus”	  because	  the	  name	  
Erasmus	  was	  displayed	  at	  least	  four	  times	  on	  each	  screen	  for	  each	  condition	  (see	  Figure	  1,	  at	  the	  top	  
and	  at	  the	  bottom)	  and	  on	  the	  pictures	  that	  were	  common	  to	  all	  conditions.	  Moreover,	  the	  website	  
that	  was	  used	  closely	  resembled	  that	  of	  the	  Erasmus	  School	  of	  Economics.	  Second,	  previous	  research	  
showed	   that	   priming	   subjects	   with	   university-­‐related	   concepts	   decreased	   the	   number	   of	  mistakes	  
made	  by	   subjects	   (Dijksterhuis	  &	   van	  Knippenberg,	   1998).	   In	   our	   experiment,	   such	  priming	   should	  
mean	   that	   subjects	   should	   have	   made	   fewer	   errors	   in	   the	   individual	   choice	   tasks	   in	   the	   eyes	  
condition.	  As	  we	  have	  observed,	  especially	   in	  the	  choices	  between	  simple	  and	  compound	  gambles,	  
this	  reduction	  in	  errors	  did	  not	  occur.	  Pictures	  of	  eyes	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  better	  decisions.	  
Observing	  that	  eyes	  do	  not	  influence	  behavior	  in	  our	  individual	  choice	  tasks	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  
eyes	  will	  not	  influence	  behavior	  in	  any	  individual	  choice	  task.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  subjects	  react	  to	  
pictures	   of	   eyes	   only	  when	   the	   task	   allows	   them	   to	   demonstrate	   positive	   qualities,	   such	   as	   being	  
smart,	  conscientious,	  or	  successful,	  in	  an	  obvious	  manner	  and	  that	  our	  tasks	  did	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  do	  
so.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   both	   of	   the	   individual	   choice	   tasks	   were	   specifically	  
selected	  to	  maximize	  the	  chance	  of	  observing	  an	  eye	  effect.	  For	  both	  tasks,	  past	  research	  indicates	  
that	  manipulating	   anonymity	   in	   these	   tasks	   influences	   subjects’	   behavior.	   Thus,	   people	   appear	   to	  
consider	  the	  judgment	  of	  others	  while	  performing	  these	  tasks.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  task	  that	  compared	  
simple	   vs.	   compound	   lotteries,	   qualities	   such	   as	   intelligence	   or	   conscientiousness	   could	   be	  
demonstrated	   by	   choosing	   the	   objectively	   superior	   gamble	   (all	   of	   our	   subjects	   had	   attended	  
mathematical	  courses	  about	  probability	  theory).	  
To	  conclude,	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  eyes	  should	  be	  considered	  distinct	  from	  other	  social	  cues,	  such	  
as	  reminders	  of	  peers.	  Although	  reminders	  of	  peers	  influence	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  tasks,	  the	  eye	  effect	  
appears	   to	   be	   limited	   to	   triggering	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   in	   situations	   that	   involve	   interaction.	  
Combined	  with	  findings	  from	  previous	  studies,	  these	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  responses	  
[18]	  
to	  eyes	  are	  caused	  by	  a	  social	  exchange	  heuristic	  aimed	  at	  enhancing	  cooperative	  behavior	  among	  in-­‐
group	  members	  (Mifune	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  mediated	  by	  increased	  expectations	  of	  future	  reward	  (Oda	  et	  
al.,	  2011).	  	  
	   	  
[19]	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